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When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in 
March 2010, it was supposed to usher in a new era of health care in the United States. From both 
Democrats and Republicans, we heard that it was going to change the way that Americans think 
of health insurance—depending on whom one talked to the ACA would finally create a just 
system of health care in America or usher in a Brave New World of socialized medicine and 
government takeovers. As the Affordable Care Act begins implementing its signature proposal 
this year, the so-called individual mandate, its provisions are starting to look more and more like 
reality. This paper will focus on the ethical ramifications of the Affordable Care Act—
specifically, I will examine how the different provisions included in the Affordable Care Act 
may or may not be justified under the liberal egalitarian system of justice created by John Rawls 
in the classic book, A Theory of Justice (later referred to as Theory). In my examination, I will 
extensively use insights from Norman Daniels’ 2008 book, Just Health, which applies Rawls’ 
system of justice to health and establishes a series of benchmarks for measuring the justness of 
health sector reforms. Indeed, the discussion and critique of Daniels’ theory forms another main 
focus of this paper, for it allows for a broader and more nuanced discussion of what comprises 
health justice.1  
Yet before delving into philosophical theory, I offer a few notes. First, a terminological 
one: I will refer to this expanded version of Rawls’ system of justice applied to health as the 
“Rawls-Daniels” theory, and I will use Rawls-Daniels as the philosophical basis on which I 
evaluate ACA reforms unless otherwise noted. Second, an organizational one: I cover a lot of 
ground in this paper, so I have divided it into a number of sections. Section II explains in brief 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This project was made possible (in part) by support from the Office for Undergraduate Research at UNC-Chapel 
Hill. 
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detail some of the main aspects of the theory of justice as fairness. Those familiar with Rawls 
may feel free to skim or skip this section. Sections III through VII, which constitute the bulk of 
this paper, discuss problems specific to health justice, with a primary (but not exclusive) focus 
on Daniels (I also consider articles by Christopher Boorse and Jerome Wakefield, as well as one 
of Rawls’ later works). In Section VIII, I introduce Daniels’ “Benchmarks of Fairness”, which I 
then use to evaluate the American health care system and the reforms in the Affordable Care Act. 
Section IX uses the framework of the Benchmarks to focus on ethical problems with the 
American health care system. My discussion in this section focuses exclusively on macro-level 
problems, as micro-level problems are often too small to evaluate through the lens of political 
philosophy. In Section X, I evaluate with that same framework where the Affordable Care Act 
improves the justness of the American health care system, and where it falls short.  
Ultimately, I argue that while the Affordable Care Act does make a number of 
substantive changes that will lead to a more just health care system, it fails to combat the root 
causes of injustice in the American health sector and opens Americans up to unneeded risk with 
a smattering of new, unproven experiments. Admittedly, the Affordable Care Act hardly makes 
unjust changes, and it was perhaps the best that could have been hoped for under political 
constraints. Yet before delving into how the Affordable Care Act improves and fails to improve 
the unjust nature of the American health care system, it is necessary to examine what features of 
the Rawls-Daniels theory cause us to see certain health care systems as just and unjust. 
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II. Taking a Step Back to Examine Rawlsian Justice as Fairness 
Though focused primarily on issues of justice in health care, this essay uses a Rawlsian 
framework to evaluate the justness of the Affordable Care Act. In this next section, I give the 
reader a brief sketch of the Rawlsian framework, assuming that she is unfamiliar with Rawls’ 
theory of justice as fairness. Specifically, I will use the theory that Rawls presents in his 1999 
revision of A Theory of Justice as a basis. It should be noted, however, that this brief discussion 
cannot explain many of the complexities of A Theory of Justice. To engage more deeply with 
Theory, the reader is advised to read Rawls’ writings and other academic papers (some of which 
are found in this bibliography). 
 
Procedural Justice 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is an ideal conception of justice, i.e. a conception of 
how the basic structure of a society ought to be ordered under ideal conditions.2 Rawls 
introduces a few key ideas to help us think about justice that lead us to accept the plausibility of 
his theory. First is the conception of free and equal moral and rational persons. Drawing mainly 
on Kantian conceptions of the person,3 Rawls accepts that at their base, persons have four main 
characteristics. They are: 
1) Free to make their own choices  
2) Equal to each other (or of equal value) 
3) Rational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rawls defines the basic structure of society as “the way in which major social institutions fit together into one 
system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through 
social cooperation.” (John Rawls, “The Basic Structure as Subject,” 159.) With this definition, Rawls sets apart the 
“major institutions”, examples of which include a choice of economic system (laissez-fair capitalism or statism or 
socialism), a government decision-making model (democracy or one-party state or other), and a system of child-
raising (familial or communal). These major institutions contrast with smaller-scale considerations such as 
individual transactions and specific laws. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 10–11, 225. 
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4) Possessing of moral worth.4  
These four qualities of a “person” guide much of his theory of justice as fairness. Rawls also 
introduces us to the notion of pure procedural justice, in which the outcome of a fair procedure is 
just whatever that outcome may be. In other words, the makeup of the procedure itself 
determines if some decision or outcome is just. Rawls uses the example of gambling: given that 
bets are made freely and fairly, and that no one cheats, etc., it is not a matter of justice that 
Person A wins and Person B loses, or vice versa.5 Though the outcomes are different, they are 
both equally just because of the way the gambling procedure was set up.  
Pure procedural justice underlies Rawls’ formulation of social contract theory. Social 
contract theory follows in the line of political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argue that the basic structure of a just society is derived from a 
hypothetical original agreement, or contract. Put another way, as contracts allow the contactors 
to meet their own interests, a just society should be one that best allows people to meet their 
interests. The logic underlying the social contract method is that restrictions on natural liberty 
can be justified if we would have accepted them as a basis for entering into society through 
unanimous agreement. This original agreement takes place in some type of “initial situation”, or 
“state of nature”, in which persons who are not involved in a society create an agreement, or 
contract, for how their society will function.6 Rawls’ notion of pure procedural justice 
distinguishes his social contract method from previous philosophers. For the theory of justice as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the theory of justice as fairness, persons have moral worth based on what later becomes known as the “two 
moral powers”, which are explained below. 
1. Persons are capable of understanding, applying, and acting based on principles of political justice. 
2. Persons are capable of having a “conception of the good”, a rational plan for a way of life that fulfills one’s 
unique preferences. (John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 18–19.) 
Each person, by virtue of being human, is thought to at least have the capacity to act from principles of justice and to 
have a “conception of the good”; therefore each person possesses moral worth. 
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 74–75. 
6 Ibid., 10–11. 
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fairness, as long as the original agreement to form a social contract takes place under the 
conditions of fairness, the outcome of the original agreement (i.e. decisions about the basic 
structure of society) will be just. Hence the name of “justice as fairness” for Rawls’ theory. 
 
The Original Position 
Justice as fairness puts a lot of weight on how the initial situation is conceived, since 
without a suitable conception of this situation, one cannot invoke pure procedural justice. Rawls 
creates what he calls the “original position”, which is “the most philosophically favored 
interpretation of this initial choice situation for the purposes of a theory of justice.”7 Importantly, 
the original position must emphasize the essential characteristics of free and equal moral (and 
rational) persons but ignore other factors that unfairly influence this original agreement. To 
facilitate this emphasis on essential characteristics, the original position imposes a constraint on 
the contractors, what Rawls terms the “veil of ignorance”. The veil of ignorance aims to screen 
out morally arbitrary facts that may influence a person’s decisions. Some of these morally 
arbitrary facts are part of the social lottery, whereby persons are born into positions where they 
have more or less wealth than others, and sometimes more or less liberty than others. Likewise, 
some of these morally arbitrary facts are part of the natural lottery, whereby some persons are 
born smarter, or stronger, or with more motivation than others. Some, too, are simply matters of 
taste, as some persons innately are more willing to take risks, take part in family life, or cultivate 
new experiences. Since these traits are not our choice, the veil of ignorance considers them 
morally arbitrary and thus unfit to exist in the original position. Specially, under the veil, no one 
knows: 
1) One’s own place in society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 16. 
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2) How one fares in the natural lottery (i.e. no one knows their own intelligence, strength, 
motivation, etc.) 
3) One’s conception of the good (i.e. the way of life one considers to be best for oneself) 
4) One’s aversion to risk 
5) The generation of which one is a part (i.e. whether one is part of an undeveloped society 
still based on subsistence farming, or a highly developed, industrialized society) 
 
Even without this particular knowledge, contractors still know general facts about human society 
(economic theory, psychology, and sociology). Ultimately, contractors are conceived as perfectly 
rational persons, and since all contractors are equally rational, each contractor is persuaded by 
the same arguments. Thus, unanimous decision in the original position is possible.8 
 
The Two Principles of Justice 
In the original position, contractors compare conceptions of right to find the one that each 
would prefer, if agreement can in fact be reached.9 Contractors most comprehensively compare 
conceptions of utilitarianism (outside the scope of this essay) to the “two principles of justice” 
that Rawls introduces and defends. The two principles create a liberal egalitarian conception of 
the basic structure of society. They are explained below: 
1) The first principle (principle of greatest equal liberty). Everyone is entitled to the most 
extensive system of liberties as possible, provided that these liberties are equal and 
compatible with liberty for all. Liberties include liberty of conscience, freedom of the 
person (freedom from physical and psychological oppression), right to property, and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest. 
 
2) The second principle. Inequalities in wealth and income are to be governed so that they 
work towards everyone’s advantage. This second principle is split further into two 
principles: the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. 
 
a. Principle of fair equality of opportunity. Under fair equality of opportunity, 
“those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances.”10 
Essentially, fair equality of opportunity requires that no one is prevented from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 118–123. 
9 Ibid., 106–107. 
10 Ibid., 63. 
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realizing her skills and abilities because of her disadvantaged place in society 
relative to others.  
 
b. The difference principle. Inequalities in the favor of those who are better situated 
are just if, and only if, they improve the expectations of the least well off person. 
If not, then equality must be preserved.11  
 
A further note on the difference principle: it can be thought of as a “maximin” solution, because 
it maximizes the minimum expectations that one might expect.12 Expectations, a rather broad 
term, are determined in reference to primary social goods. Primary social goods (or often, 
primary goods) include rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of 
self-respect.13 We can determine how “well” someone is situated by appealing to these categories 
of primary goods, and how much of each primary good that person has.  
Finally, the two principles of justice are lexically ordered, meaning that the first condition 
must be completely satisfied before the second is considered, the second before the third, and so 
on. The first principle (1) has lexical priority to the second (2), and within the second principle, 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity (2a) has lexical priority to the difference principle 
(2b).14 Thus, liberty must be preserved before opportunity, and opportunity preserved before 
considering inequalities of wealth and income. 
 
Justification of the Principles of Justice 
Rawls argues that the contractors in the original position would choose the two principles 
over utilitarian theories. Among other reasons, the two principles preserve the liberty of each 
person to realize her conception of the good, and do not require anyone to sacrifice their own 
good for the good of others. Moreover, the two principles minimize the risk involved with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 65–66. 
12 Ibid., 132–133. 
13 Ibid., 79, 386. 
14 Ibid., 53–54. 
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natural and social lottery, because even if one ends up in the “worst” position, that position is the 
best of all worst positions—she is still better off than the worst position in which one might end 
up if her society used different principles of justice. Since contractors are operating under a veil 
of ignorance and are choosing principles that will determine their entire life prospects, it is 
rational for them to minimize this risk.15 There are many other given reasons for why the two 
principles are preferred, but those are beyond the scope of this paper. All that is important for our 
purposes is that the contractors would, in fact, choose the two principles, and due to the nature of 
the original position, we can conclude that the two principles should govern the basic structure of 
society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 130–144. 
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III. The Philosophical Basis for Evaluating Health Reforms 
In Just Health, Daniels aims to answer what he terms the “Fundamental Question”: “As a 
matter of justice, what do we owe each other to promote and protect health in a population and to 
assist people when they are ill and disabled?” This question, he asserts, breaks down into three 
ancillary “focal questions”: 
1) “Is health, and therefore health care and other factors that affect it, of special moral 
importance?” 
2) “When are health inequalities unjust?” 
3) “How can we meet health needs fairly under resource constraints?”16 
The following sections will discuss each of these three questions.  
First, a note on method. To answer the focal questions, Daniels uses Rawls’ theory as a 
background and extends his theory to include claims about health. This extension is important 
since Rawls assumed (for sake of simplicity) that contractors in his original position could expect 
to lead healthy, full lives, thereby eliminating possible claims made in the original position on 
the basis of health inequalities. This assumption by Rawls creates considerable problems for one 
who tries to apply Rawls’ justice as fairness to health and health care, since that person must 
alter the main theory in one way without destroying the rest of the whole theory. Daniels tries to 
do this by relaxing the assumption made about healthy, full lives, which allows for the possibility 
of unhealthy people making claims of justice based on their health needs.17 This extension fits 
Daniels’ characterization of applied ethics, in which we do not merely take moral theories and 
apply them to relevant situations. Instead, we mold and shape the theories themselves to fit real-
world situations even as we shape real-world situations to fit our theories.18 Daniels’ 
characterization, what he calls “wide reflective equilibrium” is compatible with (and modeled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 11. 
17 Ibid., 47. 
18 Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification, 11. 
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after) Rawls’ characterization of how we ought to justify our ideal theory of justice. By applying 
Rawls’ theory to health, Daniels tweaks the theory so that it becomes relevant to a practical 
problem, just as I will undoubtedly tweak Daniels’ theory to apply it to a law in practice later in 
this paper. 
 The discussion that follows does not solely use, nor does it fully endorse, Daniels’ theory 
of health justice. Yet I still follow the outline of his argument in Just Health for sake of 
simplicity. Once Daniels is able to answer the three focal questions, he is able to completely 
answer his Fundamental Question, i.e. sketch out a full theory of health justice. Only when the 
Fundamental Question is answered will we turn to see how Daniels applies his theory of health 
justice to evaluate health reforms. 
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IV. Defining Health 
Since the act of promoting health factors so heavily into the moral requirements of a just 
society, we should begin by asking what exactly we mean by “promoting health”. This section is 
not meant to be a comprehensive discussion on the various ways in which health may be defined, 
but only an analysis of two main approaches to answering this question 
 
Health Needs 
Daniels sees the task of promoting health largely as one of meeting health needs—i.e., if 
we meet health needs then we promote health (which thereby promotes opportunity, and so on).19 
So then, what does Daniels mean by health needs? Taking first the concept of needs, Daniels 
differentiates them from preferences, asserting that our needs are what we require for normal 
species functioning. Since interferences with normal functioning limit a person’s range of 
opportunities for achieving her life plans, maintaining normal functioning is important for any 
notion of opportunity governed by the principle of fair equality of opportunity.20  
Given this conception of needs, Daniels turns to the concept of health, which he 
characterizes narrowly as the absence of pathology.21 There are two aspects of this definition 
worth noting: first, the use of “absence,” and second, the definition’s narrow nature. By viewing 
health as a negative term instead of a positive one,22 we can reach the crucial conclusion that the 
quality of one’s health cannot be promoted infinitely. When one lacks pathological conditions, 
her health needs are met. She cannot be made healthier. As such, we do not hold a moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 30. 
20 Ibid., 31–34. 
21 Pathology can be defined loosely as a disruption of health, i.e. any significant type of disease, injury, or 
disorder/disability. The succeeding paragraph explains pathology in more depth. 
22 “Negative” and “positive” here are, of course, used descriptively and not normatively. 
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obligation to enhance her health to further improve her opportunity.23 Second, the narrowness of 
the definition means that we are not concerned with an all-inclusive definition of health as 
complete well-being; we consider only whether one has a pathology and not whether one is 
generally happy and fulfilled. This narrow definition has the benefit of making the health claims 
that we will have to make on each other as objective as possible; Daniels notes that claims about 
health will be “as value-free as the biomedical sciences themselves.”24 
 
Health as Species-Typical Functioning 
 Of course, the biomedical sciences are not necessarily value-free, and the concept of 
“pathology” deserves more explanation before being wrapped into a theory about health justice. 
In Just Health, Daniels mainly looks at two analyses of health: the “species-typical functioning” 
account of Christopher Boorse, and the “harmful dysfunction” account of Jerome Wakefield. For 
his part, Daniels hesitates to adopt either view fully, claiming that both have their merits and 
both can be squared with his conception of health justice. While this ambiguity gives more 
flexibility to his theory of health justice, it fails to treat seriously the complicated notion of 
pathology inherent in thinking about health justice. A suitable definition is important: we must 
have a definition that is broad enough to demand that justice cover cases we intuitively agree 
should fall under the health care system,25 yet we cannot tolerate a definition of health so broad 
as to demand that the vast swath of society’s resources go to eliminating pathology, when other 
institutions like schools and transportation infrastructure need adequate funding from society (via 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 152–153. 
24 Ibid., 36–38. 
25 We might think of various types of cancer, or organ failure, or mental dysfunctions such as severe schizophrenia 
as paradigm cases. The latter case (and mental dysfunction in general) often leads to larger questions about how to 
define mental health (and in this sense I beg the question), but still it seems intuitive that a case such as severe 
schizophrenia would be thought of as something to be treated in the realm of the health care system.  
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the demands of fair opportunity). In addition, we do not want a theory that classifies conditions 
as pathologies that, upon reflection, are not pathologies. Wakefield, in his essay “The Concept of 
Mental Disorder”, gives the historical example of “drapetomania”, the “disease” that caused 
slaves to run away from their masters.26 A more recent, contentious example might be the 
“diagnosis” of homosexuality, a case that will be examined later. 
 To distance himself from these problematic value-laden definitions of pathology, 
Christopher Boorse argues for a non-normative account of pathology that turns on species typical 
functioning. Boorse’ view consists of a few main elements: 
1) An organism is healthy when it is not diseased, or pathological. 
2) A pathology arises when: 
a. Some natural function of the organism (natural as related to evolutionary survival 
or reproductive needs) is interfered with. 
b. The dysfunction that occurs is not “species-typical,” or if it is typical, it is due to 
environmental factors.27 
This seems to be an attractive and nuanced account of how we think about health. Under this 
view, we can statistically assess conditions to determine if they are, in fact, atypical enough to be 
pathological (presumably there would be some threshold for typicality). We can rule out a 
ridiculous condition like “drapetomania” due to its lack of interference with a natural function 
and its typicality, and at the same time we can rule out atypical conditions like abnormally high 
IQ as unhealthy due to its aid, instead of interference with, a natural function.  
 
Health as the Absence of Harmful Dysfunction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Jerome C. Wakefield, “The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary between Biological Facts and Social 
Values,” 377–380. 
27 Christopher Boorse, “What a Theory of Mental Health Should Be,” 62–63. 
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Wakefield critiques Boorse’s argument by pointing to cases that may be pathological but 
are not thought of as such by the species-typical view. Chronic back pain, even when not 
species-typical, may not impact one’s chances of survival or reproduction, and as such Boorse’s 
account would not treat it as pathological. Yet we intuitively want to view an uncomfortable 
condition like back pain as a pathology deserving of treatment. Perhaps more disturbing, 
Boorse’s account has an apparent tendency to treat as diseases conditions that we might not 
consider pathological. Homosexuality comes to mind: it is both statistically uncommon and 
harmful to reproduction. Boorse may here respond that there is a difference between disease and 
illness,28 and only illnesses should be treated.29 So though we might view homosexuality as a 
disease, we need not “treat” it. Yet it may come as little solace to homosexual people to hear that 
their lifestyle is in fact a disease, but not one worth treating. In light of these problems, 
Wakefield offers a partly value-based account of pathology, generally known as the “harmful 
dysfunction” model. Specifically, a condition is pathological if and only if: 
1) The condition causes a person some type of harm, as judged by that person’s culture, and  
2) The condition is explained by some type of failure of a biological mechanism to perform 
its “natural function”. The natural function is the function that explains (from an 
evolutionary standpoint) why that mechanism exists. 
This part-descriptive, part-normative definition of disease gets away from the more strictly 
evolutionary advantage/disadvantage notion advocated by Boorse, and it resolves some of the 
questions raised in preceding paragraphs. First, conditions that we might think of as painful or, in 
Wakefield’s words, “undesirable”, may merit treatment regardless of whether they confer 
evolutionary disadvantage. Second, benign conditions such as homosexuality will not count as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Illnesses are diseases that are normatively undesirable. (Ibid., 63.) 
29 Ibid.	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disorders so long as the culture does not see homosexuality as undesirable (I assume here that 
one might argue homosexuality involves some dysfunction of a sexual drive, although that 
argument may be disputed). This definition of pathology has the peculiar (and maybe perverse) 
effect of allowing society, on some level, to control what is pathological or not, and we can 
imagine many cultures that might justify treating homosexuality or outspokenness (perhaps a 
failure of the mechanism of control?) as pathological. This consequence may lead one to accuse 
Wakefield’s approach of a type of medical and moral relativism, as we intuitively do not want to 
cede our ability to criticize other cultures’ stances on conditions such as homosexuality. We 
might instead criticize the norms that cultures use to define homosexuality as pathological, but 
more in-depth exploration of that argument unfortunately lies outside the scope of this paper. 
Indeed, our discussion of Boorse and Wakefield must end without resolving all disputes for 
either approach. For our purposes, it is important to note that the definitions of pathology and 
health have both descriptive and normative notions—to ignore the normative notion of 
desirability when talking about whether or not someone is healthy is to ignore an integral part of 
what it means to be healthy. 
 
Conclusion 
 Before transitioning back to Daniels’ discussion of health justice, I want to offer two 
comments on the preceding discussion. The first is a procedural one. My process for determining 
the adequacy of Wakefield’s definition of health justice over that of Boorse followed Daniels’ 
method of justification in applied ethics: we took theories and principles and tested them against 
real-world scenarios. A similar pattern of discussion will emerge throughout the rest of the paper. 
Second, by using a “harmful dysfunction” account of health in health justice, we give one’s 
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society even more latitude in determining what a just health system looks like. For (as we will 
learn later), not only are resource-allocation decisions particular to each society; so too is the 
very notion of what constitutes pathology (and thus, what may be treated). My health justice 
rights as a citizen of the United States may look very different than those of a citizen of Finland, 
or Slovakia, or Zambia. That seems intuitively fair, and (within limits) perhaps empowers 
different societies to take seriously the interplay between their own norms and how their citizens 




V. Focal Question 1: Is Health of Special Moral Importance? 
This section covers a lot of ground, so a roadmap is perhaps merited. The following 
argument focuses broadly on defining the notion of opportunity in reference to health needs. 
Daniels’ aim here is to show that health is a component of opportunity, and as such, merits a 
special importance through the principle of fair equality of opportunity. In navigating through 
this argument, I turn first to evaluate whether health is, in fact, a socially determined good, the 
lack of which can lead one to a claim upon justice. Here I find that, while health is in large part 
naturally determined, one’s society plays an instrumental role in determining one’s health 
outcomes, meaning that there might be injustice in certain cases in which one is unhealthy. I 
consider as well the objection that the notion of opportunity that Daniels uses is different from 
the notion that Rawls uses. I then look into how we can justify considering health as part of one’s 
opportunity, focusing heavily on Daniels’ notion of a “normal opportunity range.” Finally, I raise 
some further questions in the form of a case in which the fair equality of opportunity notion of 
health might fall short, and with the help of Rawls, I suggest an additional method for justifying 
the importance of health care needs. In this section, I will use a number of cases that I deem to be 
philosophically relevant, including sickle cell anemia, homosexuality, and HIV/AIDS. My 
motivation for doing so is to tease out nuances in certain theories, but I readily admit that my 
grasp on the medical knowledge of these cases is not deep. I hope the reader will be forgiving in 
my lack of medical details and accept these cases in the form I present them so that deeper 
philosophical issues can be considered. I do not believe that my simplified cases will invalidate 
the philosophical points I want to make.  
 
Health as a Part of Fair Equality of Opportunity 
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Daniels’ task in answering the first focal question is complicated by the convoluted 
nature of health. Quite simply, health does not fit neatly into the category of natural good, nor 
into the category of social good. When we consider the fact that, by stroke of genetic luck, some 
are born with genetic disorders that require more extensive health care needs, such as sickle cell 
anemia, while others are born healthy, health seems to us like a natural good—there is little 
society could have done to affect the genetic pairing that created sickle cell anemia. Yet as we 
will explore later, social factors influence our health status to a much greater extent than we 
might have expected. Indeed, there is reason to suggest that there exists a causal link between 
low socioeconomic status and poor health status.30 Consider a person who must work two jobs to 
support her family because her society bars unskilled workers from organizing to demand decent 
wages. Her immune system may be compromised because of the exhaustion of working two jobs. 
If that person contracts a serious virus that could have been avoided with a stronger immune 
system, we have reason to believe that health is a social good as well.  
Given that health is, in part, a natural good, Daniels wisely resists the temptation to treat 
health as some type of primary social good in itself that could be subject to the difference 
principle. Instead, he argues that promoting health protects opportunity, and consequently 
promoting health falls under the requirements assigned by Rawls’ principles of justice to protect 
fair equality of opportunity.31 Indeed, this seems like a warranted conclusion, since poor health 
limits the life plans available to us, and our opportunity to choose among them.32 This concept 
will be explored in more depth later in this section. Daniels explains that tying health to fair 
opportunity33 gives greater power to justice as fairness by allowing it to cope with a greater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 79–80. 
31 Ibid., 29–30. 
32 Ibid., 44. 
33 A shortened term for “fair equality of opportunity.” I will use both interchangeably. 
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variety of competing claims, and by allowing it to respond to criticism that the theory fails to 
adequately measure what is important to citizens qua free and equal persons with rational plans 
of life.34 Indeed, Rawls asserts in Theory that justice as fairness aims to derive acceptable 
principles of justice from the weakest possible assumptions, as well as to include the largest 
possible collision of claims for those principles to resolve.35 Daniels’ extension of the theory 
strengthens justice as fairness on both counts, as it eliminates a rather strong assumption inherent 
in Rawls’ original position (full, healthy lives) and sketches out a method for resolving 
competing health claims. Also, by tying health needs into fair equality of opportunity instead of 
the difference principle, Daniels avoids basing his account of health needs on the most 
controversial part of Rawls’ principles of justice; indeed, one who disputes the adequacy of the 
difference principle may still be able to accept the requirement to meet health needs as a 
condition of fair opportunity.  
Daniels does note that this extension requires a broader justification than the original 
version of justice as fairness—we no longer use an account of opportunity solely focused on job 
and career access. Instead, we must incorporate into fair equality of opportunity the notion of a 
full opportunity range of life plans.36 By the full opportunity range of life plans, Daniels 
emphasizes the full set of options available to us that help us promote our conception of the good. 
This notion extends considerably from the narrow notion of an opportunity range used in Theory, 
in which the options available to us are only relevant so far as they concern our ability to broaden 
our shares of primary social goods, i.e. income, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. In 
this sense, the narrow notion of an opportunity range concerns mainly jobs and careers. The 
distinction is important. If I lose functioning in my legs, my opportunity range will be damaged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 21, 65–67. 
35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 456–457. 
36 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 58–60. 
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in the narrow sense only in the respect that I may not be able to do certain jobs like working as a 
summer camp counselor or a lumberjack. Yet in the broader notion of opportunity, my 
opportunity range will be further narrowed by my not being able to participate in activities like 
hiking, or running a marathon with friends, or going on political marches. As such, the broader 
notion of opportunity includes substantially more health conditions under the demands of justice, 
and it seems to square with our considered judgment that a plan of life is not merely about 
acquiring the job one needs. As such, the broader notion of opportunity should not give us too 
much pause. 
  
Justifying Health as Part of Opportunity 
To justify health as part of opportunity, we need the help of more terminology to talk 
about opportunity. We can talk about a “normal opportunity range” (also referred to as a “normal 
range”), which is the set of life plans that are feasible for reasonable persons to adopt, subject to 
the constraints of their society. When we know which persons meet the normal range in a society 
(and which do not), we can determine the extent of fair equality of opportunity in that society. 
Moreover, how adequately one’s health needs are met affects the share of the normal range open 
to that person.37 Thus, with the concept of the normal opportunity range we can see how unmet 
health needs can directly affect one’s opportunity, at least in a weak sense.38 At this point, we 
must reconsider Rawls’ notion of fair equality of opportunity. Under Rawls’ formulation, fair 
opportunity demands that those with similar skills and abilities are required to have the same life 
chances, or opportunities, in jobs and careers. Since we have chosen to expand our notion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., 43–44. 
38 The claim is weak in the sense that it does not tell us anything normative about this lack of opportunity. At this 
point, we can only describe that failing to meet health needs restricts opportunity. We cannot say that these unmet 
health needs are unfair, or unjust. The stronger claim, that unmet health needs affect fair equality of opportunity for 
a society will be discussed shortly.  
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opportunity, we can say that fair equality of opportunity obtains when those with similar skills 
and abilities have the same access to the parts of life that one would reasonably need in order to 
fulfill her life plan (perhaps wealth, free time, family, and so on). In short, fair opportunity 
obtains when those with similar skills and abilities have access to similar shares of the normal 
opportunity range. The qualification about “similar skills and abilities” is important here, for it 
means that not all disparities in opportunity are subject to the constraints of justice. Since skills 
and abilities are determined naturally, fair opportunity forbids only those disparities in 
opportunity that result from social conditions. If nature produces disparities among us in regards 
to opportunity, those disparities might be said to be lucky or unlucky. However, if society 
produces disparities among us in regards to opportunity, those disparities are unjust. 
Finally, we are able to derive Daniels’ account of health as being connected to 
opportunity. Since society in part determines how one’s health needs are met, and meeting those 
health needs affects our share of the normal range, fair equality of opportunity requires that we 
meet people’s health needs when possible. Measures such as access to care when we have 
pathologies, and prevention of those pathologies if possible, protects people’s shares of the 
normal range, and thus are required by the Rawls-Daniels system of health justice. Yet it is 
unclear, at least in terms of resources spent for health services, how far we can stretch fair 
opportunity. To take the previous example of the child born with sickle cell anemia, it is clear 
that such a child will have worse health outcomes, and thus have her share of the normal range 
lessened, by sickle cell anemia. Yet it is similarly clear that society is not at fault for that child’s 
sickle cell anemia. Since the sickle cell anemia is due, at least in this instance, solely to natural 
factors, it seems as if we are left with two options, neither of which are very attractive for the 
Rawls-Daniels view. First, we might define Rawls’ “skills and abilities” narrowly, rejecting that 
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health status falls under skills and abilities. As such, all differential health outcomes become the 
subject of justice, and society must broadly control them to make sure that everyone is equally 
healthy. This option, however, requires that the child with sickle cell anemia have the same 
opportunities as a child without any pathology. Which is to say, this option is practically 
impossible.  
The other option is to say that, at least in these special cases of genetic disorders, society 
does not have any requirement from justice to care for the child with sickle cell anemia. This too 
does not seem to square with our considered judgments. If a child were to die because she had a 
sickle cell crisis and she did not get treated, we would think that unjust. Thus on some level, our 
moral judgments demand that we treat a child who is sick. It is instructive here to look at why 
that child did not get treated, and how those reasons for lack of treatment impact our considered 
judgments. If that child was on a camping trip and was too far away from medical help when she 
needed it, we might think it unlucky, or the fault of the trip organizer, or a cosmic injustice, but 
not a social injustice. Any child stuck in that situation would probably have reached that same 
fate. But if the child did not get treated because she could not afford treatment, we think of it as a 
failure of social justice and of fair opportunity. A person in the same situation could have lived 
had she had access to more wealth. In other words, the disease was not socially caused, but the 
availability of treatment was, and thus the outcome was as well. From this case, we see that fair 
equality of opportunity is able to require equal treatment for pathologies, even when those 
pathologies are not socially caused. Fair opportunity does not tolerate disparities in treatment of 
a pathological condition, nor does it tolerate disparities in the application of preventative or 
curative medicine. This interpretation of fair opportunity better captures our considered 
judgments about health justice, and avoids an impractically broad interpretation of the factors 
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that might give rise to a claim on justice. Since this notion of fair opportunity demands equal, not 
just efficient treatment, prevention, and curing in medicine, health is of special moral importance.  
 
Further Questions Beyond Fair Equality of Opportunity 
One might still raise the question of what the Rawls-Daniels theory says in cases where a 
specific pathology affects only one group of people with similar enough social standing that 
disparities in treatment do not arise. The early years of the AIDS epidemic in the United States 
stands as an interesting case study here. Simplifying quite a bit, the AIDS epidemic affected 
mainly gay males in gay communities. This case presents problems for fair opportunity for two 
reasons. First, while the spread of HIV/AIDS at that point in time affected some of the most 
marginalized communities in the country, it did not appear to be influenced by any broad societal 
factors. In short, people did not get the virus because they were marginalized. Second (and 
generalizing a bit) there did not exist groups of people that received better treatment than other 
groups—no good treatment was available.39 Because the disease occurred without societal 
influence and society did not favor any one group over another for treatment, it would appear 
that the United States’ delayed response was not unjust. Yet, the medical community’s willful 
ignorance of this epidemic harmed a lot of people, and the case stands as a paradigm example of 
unjust medical practices. 
Turning to Rawls, we can find some perspective on how we are to think about 
opportunity in this case of medical care. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls notes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Again, this is a broad and simplified claim, but it is hard to deny that the medical profession dragged its feet to 
treat AIDS patients. Daniels notes in a later section of Just Health that the American Medical Association allowed 
physicians not to treat AIDS patients until 1987, and a number of physicians still refused to treat patients in 1990. 
(Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 221.) My point here is not to get into an historical 
discussion on the state of AIDS treatment. I only want to note that there seem to have been times in recent history in 
which society’s treatment of some pathology has failed not only some but all people with that pathology. 
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the notion of primary goods protects citizens’ ability to be fully cooperating members of society. 
Further, our index of the primary goods of income and wealth stretches beyond individual 
income and wealth—socially provided medical care (and other social measures that promote 
individuals’ health) can be included in one’s income. Thus when providing health care, a just 
society should devote resources to health care up to the point where the expectations of the least 
well-off are worsened.40 As such, the difference principle provides us with a road map for 
providing health resources fairly when appeals to fair opportunity cannot be easily invoked. 
Outside of opportunity, society should spend more on health resources (including pathology 
research and treatment) until the spending starts to decrease the expectations of the least well off. 
In the earlier AIDS case, for example, resources should be devoted to AIDS research and 
treatment as long as devoting those resources increases the expectations of the least well off 
group in society. 
Yet, we should be wary of blindly applying the difference principle to all competing 
health claims. The difference principle is derived in the original position and intended to 
introduce additional constraints on a state that already grants full political liberty and fair 
equality of opportunity. In trying to apply the difference principle to judge real-world situations 
where there are severely oppressed groups of people, we run the danger of asking too much. We 
do not know in the original position how specific people might need treatment, which individuals 
will have the lowest expectations, or how individuals might respond to treatments. Rawls 
acknowledges this problem in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, noting that spending for health 
resources should be decided by a just state’s legislature, as it is out of the realm of the original 
position.41 Rawls also notes that the goods that one expects to receive may be very different ex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 170–173. 
41 While Rawls does not consider medical care in Theory, he does comment on it in later works. 
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ante than what one actually receives ex post, since there are always contingencies affecting the 
outcome of resource spending.42 Daniels, too, acknowledges that the two principles cannot 
resolve all issues of health justice and shows the need for a method by which a society can justly 
adjudicate health resource claims.43 Such a system will be discussed in Section VII.   
 
Conclusion 
In this section we found that, since health is included in one’s normal opportunity range, 
health has special moral importance via its corollary to fair equality of opportunity. First, we 
were able to expand Rawls’ notion of opportunity to a broader notion that includes health needs. 
We then used the concept of the normal opportunity range to produce a metric in which 
pathology can harm one’s opportunity. With this metric, we saw that fair opportunity requires 
that those with similar skills and abilities have access to similar shares of the normal opportunity 
range, which in turn requires that one’s health needs must be met regardless of one’s position in 
society. Finally, we raised some questions as to how broadly fair opportunity might be stretched, 
and suggested that the difference principle might still be able to guide medical resource 
allocation in a few circumstances.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid., 173. 
43 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 24–26. 
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VI. Focal Question 2: When Are Health Inequalities Unjust? 
 We turn now to Daniels’ second focal question of when health inequalities themselves 
are unjust in some society. In this section, I again follow Daniels’ method of argument in Just 
Health. Using Daniels and a study by John Lynch et al on inequality, I look at the social factors 
that lead to health inequalities: namely, access to health services, one’s socioeconomic status 
(SES), and the level of inequality of society as a whole. Ultimately, I agree with Daniels’ claim 
that health inequalities are unjust if, and only if, they result from a non-universal health care 
system, or from unjust background inequalities (as defined by Rawls’ two principles of justice).  
 
Universal Health Care 
Our intuitions often suggest that justice requires universal health care, but it will be 
helpful to spell out how this argument is made under the Rawls-Daniels theory. In the previous 
section, we saw that the Rawls-Daniels view requires children with sickle cell anemia to have 
access to the same treatments for their pathology, regardless of their ability to pay. This was 
because the theory of justice as fairness does not permit opportunity to be tied to wealth, under 
the principle of fair opportunity. In the sickle cell case, the child’s health status, and therefore her 
opportunity, was limited by her wealth, which constituted an injustice. We can apply this logic 
more broadly to say that, for all pathologies, the principle of fair opportunity requires that one’s 
access to treatment must not depend on one’s wealth. This requirement, therefore, implies that 
societies must provide universal health care for their citizens.  
Both Rawls and Daniels concur on the need for universal health care. Daniels argues that 
society ought to provide “universal comprehensive health care, including public health, primary 
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health care, and medical and social support services,”44 since these help to meet society’s 
obligations that it promote population health and reduce health inequalities.45 In Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls includes “a basic level of health-care provided for all” among 
the arrangements necessary in a property-owning democracy.46 
 
Other Social Factors Influencing Health Outcomes 
Yet accessibility of medical care is not the only factor influencing how healthy we are. 
People’s health statuses (also referred to as “health outcomes”) are intersectional in nature, 
meaning that they are influenced by a litany of social factors from different parts of society. 
One’s health status is determined not only by the amount of health care one has access to, but 
also one’s socioeconomic status, the presence (or lack thereof) of pollutants or carcinogenic 
chemicals where one lives, the stress level of one’s work environment, among other factors. On a 
population level, the health outcomes of a population do not depend solely (or even principally) 
on its members’ access to health care; instead, factors such as SES, race, and gender have a large 
influence.47  
Since the scope of this paper is rather limited, I will focus mainly on the influence on 
health outcomes obtained by the broad metrics of socioeconomic status and income inequality. 
As mentioned in the previous section, it has become a well-known fact that people with higher 
SES have longer, healthier lives, and there is strong evidence to suggest that a low 
socioeconomic status actually causes people to be less healthy (instead of one’s poor health 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This requirement applies mainly to societies that have enough economic resources to support health services. 
Many countries in today’s world meet and exceed that resource threshold (one need not be a “highly developed” 
country to meet it), but obviously it would be unreasonable to ask a society with a subsistence economy to provide 
comprehensive health care. 
45 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 96. 
46 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 176. 
47 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 5, 79–83. 
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causing a low SES).48 Indeed, the classic Whitehall studies of British civil servants showed that 
even among a population with completely equal access to health care, one’s civil service rank 
had an enormous impact on one’s life expectancy and other health measures.49 Since one’s civil 
service rank often parallels one’s SES, this finding points to SES being an important determinant 
of health outcomes.  
Looking at income inequality, there is controversial evidence to suggest that the presence 
of income inequality by itself leads to worse health outcomes, meaning that a society might be 
damaging its health outcomes merely by maintaining a high level of economic inequality. 
Daniels cites a study by Lynch et al of U.S. metropolitan areas, which suggests that societies 
with higher income inequality had more deaths across all income quartiles—paradoxically, even 
the richest in unequal societies are made less healthy.50 Yet we must be cautious reading too far 
into these results about income inequality. The study was measuring association, not causation: 
Lynch et al found that, when comparing areas in the United States, those with high income 
inequality had an “excess of death” equivalent to all deaths due to heart disease. Furthermore, 
studies from other areas of the world, including studies across OECD countries, did not find the 
same association between inequality and morbidity. Daniels postulates that this link between 
inequality and excess morbidity may obtain only across societies that are already highly unequal 
to begin with, such as the United States.51 
This link between income inequality and health outcomes poses problems for the Rawls-
Daniels theory. As a liberal theory, justice as fairness places no upper limit on inequalities—they 
are allowed so long as they are to everyone’s advantage. Yet if inequalities, in and of themselves, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid., 79–80. 
49 Ibid., 85. 
50 John W. Lynch et al., “Income Inequality and Mortality in Metropolitan Areas of the United States,” 1078–1079. 
51 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 87. 
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make people worse off from a health standpoint, it seems as if a society may have to place a limit 
on them. However, inequalities do not exist in a vacuum—Daniels reminds us that political, 
social, and individual mechanisms work to create more equal and unequal distributions, and 
further that the American states with low levels of income inequality tend to spend more on 
education and social safety nets.52 As such, it may not be the inequalities themselves that 
produce inferior health outcomes, but instead the policies that allow those inequalities to obtain. 
Societies looking to promote health may support those services and regulations used by more 
equal societies to deter inequality, without being forced to limit income inequality itself. 
 
Social Responsibility for Health Inequalities 
With a better grasp on the descriptive notion of how SES and levels of inequality 
influence health outcomes, we now consider the normative question of whether societies are 
responsible (from the standpoint of justice) for these health outcomes. Going back to our 
previous question of whether health is a natural or a social good, it seems clear that to some 
extent, health is a social good. Obviously, the prevalence of income inequality and of groups 
with low SES in a society is in large part socially determined. Since social policies can act to 
improve the SES of groups and to reduce income inequality, if these actions improve people’s 
health statuses then we face obligations not only from the distribution of health care in a society 
but also the distribution of other social goods. Under the theory of justice as fairness, the 
distribution of these other goods is determined by the difference principle, so if a state’s 
institutions allow inequalities that fail to satisfy the difference principle, these inequalities face 
criticism from health justice. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid., 85–87.	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Conclusion 
To conclude this discussion, there are many ways beyond access to medical care in which 
society influences one’s health status, including one’s socioeconomic status and more 
controversially, the level of income inequality in society. When we incorporate this knowledge 
into the Rawls-Daniels theory, we see that health inequalities are unjust if they result from not 




VII. Focal Question 3: Meeting Health Needs under Constraints 
 Having developed a normative account of how societies ought to govern health 
inequalities, I now embark on a brief discussion of Daniels’ third and final focal question: how a 
society ought to meet health needs under resource constraints. Here, I agree with Daniels’ 
argument in Just Health that an accountable and transparent process is needed to determine 
decisions about how to allocate medical care.  
Even after determining when health inequalities are unjust, Daniels acknowledges that 
there still exist tough questions about how societies might meet health needs fairly under 
resource constraints. For example, our theory to this point cannot say whether a society under 
resource constraints should invest in a treatment that would help a few people who are very 
unhealthy, or a treatment that would help a lot of people who are slightly unhealthy. It also 
cannot say how much a society should invest in health care overall, when doing so takes away 
resources for services like education and a social safety net. On these issues, Daniels maintains 
that reasonable people may disagree.53  
To answer these questions, Daniels turns to the Rawlsian concept of procedural justice.54 
To find the conditions that should govern a reasonable deliberative procedure, he introduces the 
concept of Accountability for Reasonableness (AFR), which is based on the notion that “reasons 
or rationales for important limit-setting decisions should be publicly available.”55 AFR has four 
main conditions: publicity, relevance, revision and appeals, and regulation. Under the Publicity 
Condition, rationales behind coverage decisions are publicly accessible. Daniels argues that this 
type of publicity would lead to a type if “case law”, which would help to ensure formal justice in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 103–106. 
54 Ibid., 110. 
55 Ibid., 117. 
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limit setting where similar cases are treated similarly.56 Under the Relevance Condition, health 
organizations or governments provide a reasonable explanation of how they are providing “value 
for money” to meet health needs under resource constraints. One important concept in the 
Relevance Condition is the need for stakeholders to help determine how relevant the reasons 
chosen by decision makers actually are to the people affected by the limits being set.57 Under the 
Revisability and Appeals Condition, health organizations and governments establish ways to 
challenge limit-setting decisions, resolve disputes about them, and revise those decisions if need 
be. This condition gives an extra safeguard against the goal of collective advantage unduly 
harming individuals. It also allows citizens access to the process of limit setting, even if they 
were not involved in the original decision.58 Finally, the Regulative Condition ensures that the 
other conditions are met.59  
Thus, societies with just health systems will allow for a process like AFR to fairly resolve 
questions about meeting health needs under resource constraints. AFR fills a crucial hole in the 
Rawls-Daniels theory of health justice, and allows us to better answer some of the sticky disputes 
about cases previously mentioned in this essay. In the earlier AIDS case, for example, the 
specific level of funding devoted to HIV/AIDS research need not be determined by the two 
principles of justice alone; instead, a society may employ AFR to ensure that stakeholders’ needs 
are being fairly considered. Even if we accept the Rawls-Daniels theory, we may have different 
value judgments that lead us to prefer different funding levels for this AIDS case, and AFR 
allows us to reconcile those value judgments without collapsing the theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid., 118–121. 
57 Ibid., 123–129. 
58 Ibid., 131–132. 
59 Ibid., 133. 
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Before moving on, I want to offer some comments on AFR. First, it must be stressed that 
AFR need not lead to identical decisions across different societies or different health plans so 
long as the decisions are reached fairly and reasonably.60 As such, two people who have the same 
pathology, but live in different societies, may be subject to two different treatment decisions. 
While troubling at first, since it appears to be arbitrary treatment, this outcome of different 
treatment decisions makes intuitive sense: it is unreasonable to expect the country of Moldova to 
give its citizens the same medical treatments as might be found in the much richer country of 
Japan. Second, we find again with AFR the prevalence of non-justice-related value judgments in 
our theory of health justice. Just as societies may hold different (but reasonable) values about 
what constitutes pathology (according to Wakefield’s view), so too may societies hold different 
(but reasonable) values about what constitutes adequate treatment and funding. This toleration of 
differing values gives our theory a considerable measure of flexibility, but it comes at the cost of 
possibly allowing resource allocation decisions in societies that do not square with our moral 
intuitions. Finally, Daniels supposes that the transparency central to AFR has the potential to 
enhance the democratic process, because it empowers citizens in a society to think deliberately 
about how they ought to allocate health resources.61 This supposition may or may not prove true, 
but it is encouraging to think that creating a just health care system could improve the process of 
democracy itself. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., 135–137. 
61 Ibid., 123. 
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VIII. Benchmarks of Fairness 
 In the previous three sections, we answered each of Daniels’ focal questions, which 
allows us to answer his Fundamental Question of what we owe each other to “promote and 
protect health in a population” and assist people who are unhealthy.62 We found that health is of 
special moral importance as a part of fair equality of opportunity, that health inequalities are 
unjust when resulting from differences in access to medical care and from background 
inequalities (as measured by the difference principle), and that further allocative disputes can be 
resolved through the process of Accountability for Reasonableness. So concludes our discussion 
on the theory of health justice. 
 
Benchmarks of Fairness 
We will now establish practical principles that will allow us to evaluate the reforms made 
under the Affordable Care Act from the standpoint of the Rawls-Daniels theory of health justice.  
Here, I piggyback on the work of Daniels, who establishes the “Benchmarks of Fairness” for 
health care system reform in a later section of Just Health. The Benchmarks of Fairness are 
categorized as follows: 
 Category 1: Equity 
o B1: Intersectoral Public Health 
o B2: Financial Barriers to Equitable Access 
o B3: Nonfinancial Barriers to Access  
o B4: Comprehensiveness of Benefits and Tiering  
o B5: Equitable Financing 
Category 2: Efficiency 
o B6: Efficacy, Efficiency, and Quality Improvement  
o B7: Administrative Efficiency  
Category 3: Accountability  
o B8: Democratic Accountability and Empowerment  
o B9: Patient and Provider Autonomy 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid., 11. 
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Before explaining each of them, I offer some of Daniels’ comments on how the Benchmarks as a 
whole lead to just health sector reforms. First, it should be noted that efficiency is pursued 
because we have obligations to justice outside of the health care system that also require 
resources. Health systems must be “clinically and administratively effective and efficient” to be 
just.63 Second, organizations and governments must resist temptations to introduce new, untested 
reforms aimed at improving health care system efficacy or efficiency. Daniels notes that many of 
these so-called health sector reforms are essentially social experiments with inadequate scientific 
and ethical review, giving the example of U.S. insurers who are experimenting with new 
deductible structures without reviewing the effects of these structures.64 Thus, countries need 
agencies and mechanisms for accountability, as well as adequate scientific/ethical reviews when 
undertaking health sector reforms.65 Finally, Daniels stresses that the Benchmarks do not demand 
ideal healthy systems, only progress towards the reduction of inequitable access, inefficiency, 
and unaccountability.66 
 Due to the scope of the ACA, I focus mainly on the Benchmarks relating to equity and 
efficiency. The relevant Benchmarks (B2-B7) are explicated as follows:  
• Equity 
o Benchmark B2: Financial Barriers to Equitable Access concentrates on 
“producing uniform and more adequate benefits across all groups of workers” and 
ensuring that the health plans by which these workers gain access are compatible 
with each other. 
o Benchmark B3: Nonfinancial Barriers to Access also has two criteria. The first 
requires that reforms equitably distribute drugs, supplies, facilities, and personnel; 
the second requires the dismantling of gender barriers. 
o Benchmark B4: Comprehensiveness of Benefits and Tiering generally asserts that 
tiering of benefits reduces the fairness of health systems.67 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., 246–248. 
64 Ibid., 244–245. 
65 Ibid., 269–272. 
66 Ibid., 251. 
67 However, if “a small but wealthy group does better than the others” and the “others” still have access to an 
adequate benefit package, a tiered system might be justifiable. 
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o Benchmark B5: Equitable Financing requires that medical services be financed by 
persons’ ability to pay.68 
• Efficiency 
o Benchmark B6: Efficacy, Efficiency, and Quality Improvement promotes 
evidence-based practice for providing and reforming health services. 
o Benchmark B7: Administrative Efficiency requires controls for overhead, cost of 




 This concludes our discussion of Norman Daniels’ book, Just Health. With these 
practical principles in place, we are in a position now to analyze to what extent the Affordable 
Care Act meets the requirements of our theory of health justice in reforming the American health 
care system. Such an analysis will be the focus of the next few sections of this paper. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Generally, tax-based systems are more equitable than premium-based systems, provided that the taxes are 
progressive in nature. Premium-based systems are more equitable if premiums are community-rated rather than risk-
rated, meaning that one does not pay more for being more prone to getting sick. 
69 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 257–261. 
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IX. Problems with the American Health Care System 
 Before I delve into the specific policies enacted by the Affordable Care Act, some 
context is necessary. This next section will focus on the American health care system pre-ACA 
and the ethical problems that arise from it. Specifically, I look into problems associated with 
Benchmarks B2 through B7: access, financing equity, and efficiency. Using accounts by 
journalists, policy analysts, economists, and others, I find that the pre-ACA American health care 
system is indeed guilty of deep and systemic problems relating to these Benchmarks, and more 
broadly, to the Rawls-Daniels theory of health justice. 
Steven Brill, writing for Time magazine, sums up these problems as succinctly as 
possible in his report on medical costs, 
“Unless you are protected by Medicare,70 the health care market is not a market at all. It’s 
a crapshoot. People fare differently according to circumstances they can neither control 
nor predict. They may have no insurance. They may have insurance, but their employer 
chooses their insurance plan and it may have a payout limit or not cover a drug of 
treatment they need… They have little choice of hospitals or the services they are billed 
for, even if they somehow know the prices before they get billed for the services. They 
have no idea what their bills mean, and those who maintain the chargemasters71 couldn’t 
explain them if they wanted to… They have no choice of the drugs they have to buy or 
the lab tests or the CT scans that they have to get, and they would not know what to do if 
they did have a choice. They are powerless buyers in a seller’s market where the only 
sure thing is the profit of the sellers.”72 
 
Brill’s comments echo those by economist Uwe Reinhardt, who characterizes the American 
health care system as a “moral morass” by referencing the low payment rates of Medicaid (the 
publicly-funded health insurance program for low-income Americans) that treat those in poverty 
as if their lives have less value. He also laments the lack of coverage for undocumented 
immigrants, as well as the fact that 18,000 Americans die every year because they lack health 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The government-run insurance program for citizens over age 65. 
71 Brill’s term for the seemingly arbitrary pricing system used by hospitals. See footnote 82 on p.43 for a more 
complete discussion. 
72 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care,” 54. 
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insurance and fail to get treated for preventable conditions.73 These critiques of the American 
health care system point out a few essential truths of the system that concern us morally. On the 
access front a significant portion of the population lacks insurance coverage, and even among 
those who have coverage, problems of access remain. A significant portion lacks adequate 
coverage, and both those who have coverage and those who lack it are unable in many 
circumstances to choose their hospital or treatment plan. On the financing equity front, the 
uninsured and underinsured sick finance a greater proportion of the country’s medical costs than 
we would consider equitable. On the efficiency front, the United States quite simply overpays for 
inefficient health care.  
 
Problems of Access 
 On the critique of lack of coverage, a number of concerns jump out fairly quickly. The 
Congressional Budget Office reports that 53 million Americans lacked insurance in 2012; with 
pre-ACA rules this number would have been 56 million.74 We recall that justice requires 
“universal comprehensive health care, including public health, primary health care, and medical 
and social support services.”75 A lack of health insurance clearly undermines fair opportunity in 
because of its detrimental effect on health outcomes and limiting of choices for the uninsured. 
Yet barriers to access in the pre-ACA American system are not only financial. Barriers to 
access obtain with many groups of people; in particular, women and Medicaid recipients stand 
out as two groups facing steep barriers. For women, less-than-comprehensive benefit packages 
prevent equity in access, in violation of Benchmark B3. Importantly, there has been a pervasive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Uwe Reinhardt and Tsung-mei Cheng, Sick Around the World. 
74 Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme 
Court Decision, 19. 
75 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 96. 
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refusal among insurers to cover maternity care: before the ACA, 62% of women in non-
employer insurance plans lacked have maternity coverage.76 This lack of coverage creates both 
unequal access for those unable to pay out-of-pocket costs or more comprehensive benefit 
packages, and it creates a gender disparity: quite simply, many women cannot meet their health 
needs.  
For those on Medicaid, problems arise from the low reimbursement rates that Medicaid 
pays. Doctors are allowed to decide which patients to treat based on one’s insurance plan, 
regardless of whether that person is on the public systems of Medicare or Medicaid.77 As 
Reinhardt pointed out, in practice Medicaid’s low reimbursement rates limit those on Medicaid 
to accessing certain doctors and hospitals.78 Thus, even though Medicaid recipients are able to 
bypass many financial barriers with coverage, they still may not be able to access the doctors and 
providers that they need. Thus, the American system allows the poorest among us to go without 
treatment and to be treated by only certain doctors, a clear inequity of access.  
 
Problems of Equitable Financing 
 Yet perhaps an even more pervasive problem in the pre-ACA health care system is its 
inequitable financing structure. Of prime importance is the health care system’s tendency to 
burden the sick with undue costs. In the realm of premiums (the monthly rate paid by those 
insured to their insurance company, regardless of whether health benefits are used), the pre-ACA 
insurance market for individuals was “actuarially fair”, meaning that insurance companies would 
determine an individual’s premium based on how much the insurance company would expect to 
pay in health benefits for that individual.  This actuarial fairness makes sense when insurance is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World.” 
77 Norman Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly, 232. 
78 Uwe Reinhardt and Tsung-mei Cheng, Sick Around the World. 
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only used as a way to pool risk, but given the special importance of health, health insurance is 
often a way for society to support those who have greater health needs. Uwe Reinhardt explains 
that before the Affordable Care Act, the price of an individual’s premium could be represented 
by the equation Pi= (1 + L)Xi, where P is the price of the premium, X is the expected outlay for 
the insurance company (i.e. how much coverage for an individual will cost the company), and L 
is the markup percentage (to cover overhead and profit).79 The more pre-existing pathologies an 
individual has, the higher her premium. Yet the Rawls-Daniels theory, evidenced by Benchmark 
B5, requires that health spending be financed by ability to pay instead of expected costs per 
person. Since health needs are part of our opportunity, it is inequitable to leave their financing to 
market forces.  
Likewise, in the realm of benefit payouts many insurance plans still leave patients 
responsible for health costs after a certain point by imposing annual and lifetime benefit caps. 
This and other practices lead millions to be categorized as having health insurance even as they 
lacked adequate coverage.80 These inadequate benefits mean that the sickest among us often 
shoulder the biggest burden, an ostensibly inequitable outcome. Moreover, these financing 
inequities in health can spill over to lack of opportunity outside of the health sector—a 2009 
study found that medical bills had contributed in some way to 62% of American personal 
bankruptcies.81 Thus, even Rawls’ narrow account of opportunity in career/economic prospects 
would advocate for more equitable health sector financing, since the American system impacts 
citizens’ economic opportunity in important ways. Finally, due to bargaining agreements, 
hospitals and medical providers charge uninsured persons more for medical procedures than 
insurance companies, which have pre-negotiated prices. Hospitals are able to bill the uninsured 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Uwe Reinhardt, “‘Premium Shock’ and ‘Premium Joy’ Under the Affordable Care Act.” 
80 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care,” 32–33. 
81 David U. Himmelstein et al., “Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study,” 742. 
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on what Brill refers to as “chargemaster” prices,82 which Brill asserts do not “seem to be based 
on anything objective – like cost”.83 Though some uninsured individuals may be able to get 
discounts, many do not, leaving the low-income people who do not qualify for Medicaid but 
cannot afford adequate insurance to pay the most expensive medical bills.84 Benchmark B5 
requires that medical costs be distributed by ability to pay, and yet the American system nearly 
produces the opposite of this requirement—individuals with lower incomes face more expensive 
bills than individuals with higher incomes. This outcome should strike us as highly inequitable. 
 
Problems of Efficiency 
 Finally, the American health care system fails because it is grossly inefficient. In 2009, 
the United States led the OECD in health sector spending as a share of GDP with a 17.4% share; 
the closest country was the Netherlands with a 12.0% share and the OECD average was a 9.6% 
share.85 Even adjusted for the United States’ high GDP per capita, the United States spends 27% 
more on health care than other OECD countries. Americans were expected to spend $2.8 trillion 
on health care in 2013; a 27% overspending is equivalent to $750 billion.86 This overspending is 
not only frustrating for Americans as citizens and taxpayers, but also a violation of Benchmark 
B7 and therefore unjust. Indeed, this overspending should concern us deeply as a matter of 
justice—that $750 billion could be going to other sectors like education or environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The list of Chargemaster prices described by Brill seemed Kafkaesque—some of them included a charge of $1.50 
for an acetaminophen (Tylenol) pill (anyone can buy 100 pills for $1.49), $15,000 for blood work and lab tests 
(Medicare, using a cost-based pricing system, pays well less than $1000), $7 for an alcohol prep pad (anyone can 
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be noted that every hospital studied by Brill was a non-profit hospital. 
83 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care,” 22–23. 
84 Ibid., 24. 
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regulation that protect other notions of fair opportunity and preserve justice across generations.87 
Moreover, this overspending does not seem to lead to better health outcomes—the United States 
performed worse than the OECD average in most measures of health status, including critical 
measures such as life expectancy at birth, potential years of life lost, heart disease mortality rate, 
and infant mortality rate.88  
There are several factors in this high cost of health care in the United States, but I can 
only focus on a few here. To the extent that one can pinpoint a central reason for the high cost of 
American healthcare, things tend to center on unrestrained pricing by medical providers. Since 
the United States does not set prices for medical devices and services, but instead has allowed 
providers to base their prices on market forces,89 the same medical devices and services are more 
expensive in the United States compared to other developed countries. New York Times 
journalist Elisabeth Rosenthal notes that other nations pay about a third of what Americans do 
for both conventional birth deliveries and Caesarean sections,90 and joint replacements that cost 
upwards of $130,000 at American hospitals can cost less than $14,000 in Europe.91 
Tied in with this notion of overpayment is the problem of treatment effectiveness. Many 
systems, like the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
make coverage decisions based on cost effectiveness and treatment effectiveness.92 Yet in the 
United States, law prohibits Medicare from using even treatment effectiveness in its decisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 For a sense of what American citizens could do with that $750 billion, consider this: Jordan Weissman, in a 
somewhat cheeky article in The Atlantic, estimated that the U.S. government could make tuition at public colleges 
and universities free if it spent $62.6 billion more on education funding. Jordan Weissmann, “Here’s Exactly How 
Much the Government Would Have to Spend to Make Public College Tuition-Free.” Thus, the United States could 
eliminate undergraduate debt from public universities (ostensibly a great injustice) with less than a tenth of the 
money it overspends on health care. 
88 OECD, Health at a Glance 2011, 25–37. 
89 Jonathan Oberlander, “Throwing Darts: Americans’ Elusive Search for Health Care Cost Control,” 481. 
90 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World.” 
91 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “In Need of a New Hip, but Priced Out of the U.S.” 
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over what to cover—it must reimburse patients for most drugs approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Many private insurers have followed suit.93 Thus, Americans on the whole pay 




The obvious conclusion here is that the American health care system before the 
Affordable Care Act is unjust. It failed each of the Benchmarks set out in the previous section, as 
shown by different cases. Millions lack access to basic health services because they are not 
covered by insurance, and millions more are either underinsured or insured by Medicaid, and as 
such, restricted to certain doctors and hospitals. Individuals with lower SES often pay more for 
the same services than do individuals with higher SES. Largely due to pricing practices for 
medical services and devices, the health care system overspends close to a trillion dollars every 
year, money that could be spent to advance justice in other ways. Its barriers to access, financing 
inequity, and inefficiencies are severe and systemic. It is in this context that we can properly 
evaluate the changes proposed by the Affordable Care Act. As an act that ostensibly set out to 
limit the injustice of the system of health care in the United States, we are finally in a position to 
evaluate where it succeeded and where it failed. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Steven Brill, “Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care,” 46. 
 46 
X. Evaluating the Affordable Care Act in Regards to Justice 
Having detailed where the American health care system pre-ACA fell short in regards to 
the Rawls-Daniels theory of health justice, we can now examine how the ACA addresses those 
shortcomings. In this section, I look at a number of effects of the Affordable Care Act, focusing 
on the ACA’s methods of cost control, insurance coverage expansion, community rating, social 
experimentation, accessibility to underserved populations, shifting of costs, and its reliance on 
Medicare and Medicaid. This section will use the framework of the Benchmarks and progress 
through the categories identified in the previous section (access, equity, and efficiency) to look 
into first the improvements, and then the shortcomings of the Affordable Care Act. Though not 
covered in the previous section, I will also briefly discuss how the ACA improves upon (and 
damages) the accountability of the American health care system. It should be noted as well that 
this section will evaluate the Affordable Care Act as an instrument of policy, and not as a 
political document. Obviously, there were many political compromises made so that the ACA 
could be passed into law, but to try to ferret out those compromises and determine what the 
maximally just health care system reform law that could have been passed given the political 
climate of the United States is surely Sisyphean (or at least, a task for a political scientist). 
 
Improvements to Access, Equity, Accountability, and Efficiency 
 The Affordable Care Act succeeds, at least in part, in expanding access. The ACA 
expands Medicaid to all children and adults with incomes up to 133% of the Federal Poverty 
Level, grants subsidies to individuals with incomes up to 400% of that level, creates tax 
incentives (and penalties) for businesses to cover employees, and imposes fines on citizens and 
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documented residents who are not covered under health insurance.94 These changes mean that by 
the end of the decade, the ACA is projected to expand coverage to 30 million individuals who 
would not have otherwise been covered.95 For those who lacked coverage before and now find 
themselves able to obtain insurance, access to health services will clearly improve. This 
expansion of coverage also moves the United States towards universal comprehensive insurance 
coverage, something that Daniels and Rawls require of a society governed by justice as fairness 
in health. The ACA also expands access to the millions of underinsured Americans by regulating 
benefit packages more strictly. The Affordable Care Act prohibits insurers from denying 
coverage to individuals who have pre-existing pathologies, and insurers can no longer set annual 
and lifetime caps beyond which individuals must pay in full for health services.96 Moreover, it 
sets an “essential health benefits package” and requires all new health insurance plans to meet 
these requirements.97 Benefits required in this package stand to be more generous than benefits 
offered in many existing plans.98 The package also includes maternity care, thereby dismantling 
one of the main nonfinancial barriers to access in the current American health system.99 Thus, by 
decreasing the number of uninsured and underinsured individuals, changes set forth in the ACA 
will improve access to health services for many, and even out access across gender. 
 The Affordable Care Act also cuts down on the financing inequity inherent in the system. 
The previously mentioned expansion of Medicaid and subsidies for low-earning individuals 
move the American system closer to a system where costs are assigned by ability to pay, and the 
smaller uninsured population means that fewer people in lower SES groups will be billed 	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undiscounted, “chargemaster” prices. The ACA also takes a big step in financing equity by 
moving past the system of actuarial fairness to a community-rated system for the individual 
insurance market. If we remember the equation for the price of insurance premiums,  
Pi= (1 + L)Xi, the Xi term, which stands for the expected outlay of an insured individual, will 
now represent the average outlay per person in the community (i.e. every person that the 
insurance company covers).100 People with pathologies will pay the same in premiums as people 
without them, a requirement of Daniels’ Benchmark B5 about equitable financing.  
 While I did not discuss problems of accountability in my analysis of the problems of the 
American health care system, it should be noted that the Affordable Care Act’s new health 
insurance exchanges help to improve the sector’s transparency, and bring it closer to an 
Accountability for Reasonableness model. The exchanges create four benefit tiers (platinum, 
gold, silver, and bronze) and allow consumers to compare plans with relative ease and clarity 
about what is being covered and what costs are entailed.101 Although nothing like the robust AFR 
(with appeals processes and community input for tough decisions) has been reached, the 
exchanges do promote accountability in the individual insurance market by providing more 
information to consumers. The exchanges also promote equity in financing by lowering costs for 
consumers on the individual insurance market for many Americans. Insurers must devote at least 
75% of their revenues to health benefits,102 and premiums in the New York insurance exchanges 
are expected to fall by an average of 50% in 2014.103 Thus, by opening up these exchanges, the 
ACA allows Americans on the individual insurance market, many of whom are among the 
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poorest and sickest in society,104 not only to take more control over choosing their insurance 
coverage, but also to choose among more affordable options. The ACA, then, promotes 
accountability and equity in this context. 
 Some changes in the ACA also promote efficiency by limiting how much we spend in the 
health care system to some degree. The Affordable Care Act will save $600 billion over the next 
decade, due mostly to savings from changes in Medicare in how they pay providers and from the 
health exchanges’ focus on increased competition for insurers.105 While these cost controls are 
far from comprehensive, they do help to slow the growth of health sector. Thus, the Affordable 
Care Act takes steps towards meeting some of Daniels’ Benchmarks of Fairness for its expansion 
of health insurance to millions of Americans, its focus on community-rated health insurance 
premiums, its establishment of clearer and less expensive health insurance exchanges, and its 
modest attempt to make the health care system more efficient through lowering expenditures. 
 
Shortcomings in Access, Equity, Efficiency, and Accountability 
 Yet the Affordable Care Act is also notable for what it does not do—it leaves much to be 
desired in its attempt to make the American health system more accessible, equitable, efficient, 
and accountable. To start, the law will still leave 29 million Americans uninsured even by 
2020,106 with the uninsured population consisting mostly of undocumented immigrants, people 
who earn too much income to qualify for Medicaid but still cannot afford to purchase subsidized 
insurance,107 and people who could buy insurance but choose to pay the fine instead.108 Thus, the 	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Affordable Care Act deliberately excludes one of the most marginalized groups in the population, 
undocumented immigrants, from accessing health services and writes them out of the national 
narrative of universal health insurance. For undocumented immigrants, the changes in the ACA 
certainly do not expand opportunity; in fact, they may restrict it.  
Questions may also be raised about the essential benefits package outlined by the ACA. 
Insurers are only required to cover 60% of costs, and grandfathered insurance plans may cover 
less than that.109 While this requirement is a marked improvement from some current practices, it 
still appears to leave individuals covered by the lowest tier plans on the hook for a very 
significant portion of their health costs. This high co-payment amount will certainly make health 
services inaccessible for many who do not have the means to afford high co-payments for 
expensive procedures, thereby limiting access under Benchmark B2. In addition, Benchmark B5 
requires that medical services be financed by one’s ability to pay, and having 40% of one’s 
medical costs coming from out-of-pocket surely fails to meet this requirement. We should also 
view the expansion of Medicaid with a skeptical eye, given the problems of access that it 
engenders. Thus, though millions of Americans will gain insurance through the Medicaid 
expansion, many of those Americans will be subject to a “lower class” of medical care, where 
low payout rates will limit their access to many doctors and hospitals. 
 As far as problems with equity are concerned, the costs of the new law are in part 
financed by a new tax on so-called “Cadillac” insurance plans, which have the potential to harm 
sicker individuals. Specifically, the “Cadillac tax” works by identifying employer-sponsored 
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insurance plans that offer benefits exceeding a cost limit,110 and then imposing an excise tax of 
40% for over-limit costs on the firm who issues the insurance policy (either the plan 
administrator or the employer herself).111 Though partly a cost-control tactic, this new “Cadillac 
tax” could possibly harm sicker individuals whose plans would be so expensive not because they 
want frivolous health services, but because it is expensive to meet their health needs.112 So while 
the ACA makes great strides to not penalize individuals with pathologies in how much they pay 
for premiums, it may punish the insurance plans that cover those very individuals, bringing the 
American health care system farther away from a truly community-rated system. 
 In terms of efficiency, the ACA stopped well short of any real cost control. As shown 
earlier, there seems to be no shortage of inefficiencies to iron out in the American health system, 
yet no serious proposal for reining in these inefficiencies. As Jonathan Oberlander notes, a real 
effort to control costs in the health sector requires concentrated purchasing, budgeting and 
regulation113—essentially governments or other actors must step in to negotiate or set prices for 
medical products and services that can be applied regardless of how one is insured. Many other 
countries have used this approach very successfully, notably Japan, whose per capita spending 
on health is just over a third of what it is in the United States despite Japan having the longest 
life expectancy in the world.114 The United States uses this price-setting tactic (for medical 
services) in its Medicare system,115 yet no attempt to expand Medicare or create a Medicare-
based public insurance option was included in the Affordable Care Act. In effect, the ACA 
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sacrificed real cost cutting and attempts at efficiency for cosmetic programs that marginally cut 
costs while keeping the main system in place. 
 Finally, the Affordable Care Act fails to make the American health care system 
significantly more accountable. While individual insurance markets will become more 
transparent due to the exchanges, the ACA largely avoided any decisions about rationing in the 
face of resource constraints. No binding decisions about the comparative effectiveness of drugs 
and treatments have been implemented,116 leaving resource rationing to be determined largely on 
ability to pay and contingencies about certain situations. In addition, in the absence of systemic 
change, the cost cutting measures included in the ACA amounted to a grab-bag of 
recommendations by health economists.117 While many of these recommendations have good 
theoretical backing, they seem to closely parallel the type of social experiments that Daniels 
warns us as being inherently unaccountable. These experiments might cause real harm in terms 
of decreased access, and there is reason to worry that the United States lacks sufficient 
institutional procedures and protections to evaluate and, if need be, cease these new practices. 
 The grab-bag approach seems especially culpable in regards to justice because of the 
abundance of alternative models for health care systems that, by almost any measure, work better 
than the ACA could ever hope to work. Oberlander and Theodor Marmor note that when it came 
to cost-cutting, health policy researchers for the ACA paid little attention to international 
experience.118 As noted before, the United States health system is strikingly more expensive, 
covers fewer people, and produces worse outcomes than many other countries, and the cost-
cutting experiments of the ACA, even if wildly successful, will not change that reality. The 
United States could have, for example, adopted the Swiss model of health insurance. Like the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid., 46. 
117 Jonathan Oberlander, “Throwing Darts: Americans’ Elusive Search for Health Care Cost Control,” 477. 
118 Jonathan Oberlander and Theodore R. Marmor, “The Health Bill Explained at Last,” 6. 
 53 
United States, Switzerland has a high level of economic development, a capitalist economic 
system, a long history of private insurance, and large, powerful pharmaceutical companies.119 
The Swiss health care system is based largely on an ACA-type requirement for everyone to have 
insurance, and with the government subsidizing low-income people.120 Everyone is covered, no 
one goes bankrupt from medical costs, and insurance costs are kept low (less than 12% of GDP) 
by the aforementioned tactic of concentrated purchasing and regulation—insurance companies 
are forbidden to make a profit off of the basic health plan.121 The quality of the Swiss health care 
system also gets high marks: not only do the Swiss have some of the best health outcomes in the 
world, but also the average wait times in 2010 for elective surgery and specialist appointments in 
Switzerland were at or below wait times for Americans.122  
No two societies are identical, but it seems that Swiss and American societies are similar 
enough that the Swiss model could be adopted in the United States with largely similar results 
without much risk of spectacular failure (assuming, of course, that there would be political will 
to do so). Given that the Swiss model outperforms the American model, even with the addition 
of the ACA, spurning the Swiss model and its concentrated purchasing for the cost-cutting 
experiments outlined in the ACA creates not only a failure of reason, but also a failure of justice. 
Benchmark B6 requires evidence-based practices for reforming health services, and to put 
Americans at risk of possibly decreased access to care under cost-cutting measures while 
overlooking other, less risky options is not evidence-based, and therefore unjust. While the grab 
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bag approach of the ACA might have been politically necessary, the political necessity cannot 
excuse the risk of decreased access. 
 
Conclusion 
 Using Daniels’ Benchmarks of Fairness to evaluate the changes made to the American 
health care system under the Affordable Care Act, we’ve seen that some of those changes have 
led to a more just system, while some have not. Specifically, the ACA promotes justice by 
expanding access to medical care for many low-income Americans and Americans with pre-
existing pathologies, by making payment more equitable for those with pre-existing pathologies, 
by increasing the efficiency of the Medicare payment system, and by improving the 
accountability and transparency of the individual health insurance market. The ACA fails to 
promote justice by leaving undocumented immigrants and some low-income individuals still 
without health insurance, by continuing to condone insurance plans with large out-of-pocket 
costs that leave citizens on the hook for their health needs, by allowing the basic health care 
system structure to remain grossly inefficient, and by opening up Americans to the risk of not 
having access to medical care in the name of cost-cutting experiments.  
On the whole, we can say that the Affordable Care Act makes the American health care 
system more just by getting closer to fair equality of opportunity, on the Rawls-Daniels view. 
And yet, there remain many ways in which this law falls short on expanding opportunity, and in 
the case of undocumented immigrants, it may possibly restrict opportunity. A truly just health 
care system will require a deep, systemic change in how Americans receive, pay for, and think 
about health products and services, and the ACA simply does not make that kind of deep, 
systemic change. 
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Defenders of the Affordable Care Act may chide this analysis for being unrealistic about 
American political structures. They may argue that the ACA was the best that could have been 
done under the political circumstances, and in establishing (mostly) universal health insurance 
Americans take one big step closer to a more fair health care system. I find myself sympathetic 
to that argument. Indeed, Oberlander posits that, by giving the public a greater stake in funding 
the health care system, public pressure might mount towards making the system more 
efficient.123 From the standpoint of justice, one must remember that the Affordable Care Act is a 
step—a big one, but just a step nonetheless—towards creating a just health care system that 
affirms citizens’ rights to fair equality of opportunity. Now that the main policies of the 
Affordable Care Act have been implemented, Americans should work on taking that next step. 
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